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The Constitution and the All-White Jury
By JoiN R. GmixsPm*
Two recent Kentucky cases, Pool v Commonwxalthl and Logan v
Commonwealth2 involve object-ons by defendants, in both cases
Negroes, to indictment by a grand jury in the selection of wich, it
was alleged, Negroes had been systematically excluded because of
their race. Since this ground for appeal is being extensively employed
throughout the South, as evidenced by the above cases and by a series
of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States,3 it Is
thought appropriate to examine in this note the extent of the constitu-
tional right of a Negro to a jury from which his race is not sys-
tematically excluded, and to point out the legal steps by which he may
enforce this right.
Since 1880 when it rendered the decision in the case of Strauder v
West Virginia,4 the Supreme Court has consistently denounced dis-
crimination in the selection of juries, both grand and petit, and in those
cases in which the question has been properly raised, has reversed
convictions of Negroes in state courts which deprive those Negroes of
this right.-, In that case it appeared that a West Virginia statute pre-
vented Negroes from serving on a jury The Negro defendant, in-
dicated for murder, petitioned the trial court for a removal of the case
to the Federal court in pursuance of a Federal statute 6 which author-
*LL.B., University of Kentucky- member of Kentucky bar.
'308 Ky. 107, 213 S.W 2d 603 (1948).
308 Ky. 259, 214 S.W 2d 279 (1948).
'Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 164 (1947);
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942); Smith v. Texas,
311 U. S. 128, 61 Sup. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
U. S. 354, 59 Sup. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S.
613, 58 Sup. Ct. 753, 82 L. Ed. 1050 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S.
394, 55 Sup. Ct. 784, 79 L. Ed. 1082 (1935); Norns v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587,
55 Sup. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935).
'100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880).
'Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 164 (1947);
Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 Sup. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U. S. 354, 59 Sup. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303
U.S. 613, 58 Sup. Ct. 753, 82 L. Ed. 1050 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295
U. S. 394, 55 Sup. Ct. 784, 79 L. Ed. 1500 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S.
587, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226,
24 Sup. Ct. 257, 48 L. Ed. 41.8 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177"U. S;-442, 20 Sup.
Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839 (1900); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.-S.'803, 25 L.
Ed. 664 (1880).
'Rv. STAT. sec. 641 (1875)., 28 U. S. C. sec. 74 (1947)..
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izes such a removal when a defendant is being deprived of a constitu-
tional right, on the ground of discrimination against his race m the
selection of the jury The trial court denied the petition and the
defendant was convicted. This conviction was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of West Virginia; whereupon the defendant sued out a
writ of error in the Supreme Court of the United States, which re-
versed, holding that the petition for removal should have been granted
because of the fact that such discrimination violated the defendant's
rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.- The Supreme Court took pains to point out
that the question was not whether the defendant had a right to a jury
composed of members of the Negro race, but whether " m the
composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried,
all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because
of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man
sit upon the jury "8
That same year, however, in the case of Virginia v Rives,9 the
Court sharply curtailed the applicability of the removal statute, hold-
ing a defendant entitled to removal of hs case to Federal court only
when the law of the state in which he was being tried required dis-
crimination, as was the situation in the Strauder case. The Court
reasoned that the removal statute required that the defendant petition
for removal "before trial," and since there was no Virginia statute
which required or authorized discrimination against Negroes, the de-
fendant was unable to say in advance that his legal rights were being
denied, despite the fact that the defendant might know that the local
practice was, and had always been, to exclude Negroes from jury
service. This logic was followed m Neal v Deldware,1° also decided
in 1880, in which case the Court denied the applicability of the re-
moval statute to the defendant's case even though the Delaware con-
stitution excluded Negroes from service on the jury The Court held
that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution nullified the offending section of the state constitution; hence,
no state law, in effect at the time, sanctioned the discrimmation, and
the petition was properly denied. A similar result was reached in an
: " nor shall any state depnve any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ]unsdiction the
equal protection of the laws."8 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 305, 25 L. Ed. 664, 665 (1880).
'100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 (1880).
10103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567 (1881).
107 U. S. 110, 1 Sup. Ct. 625, 27 L. Ed. 354 (1883).
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1882 case, Bush v Kentucky," m which the alleged discrimination was
based upon a statute which had already been declared unconstitutional
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 12 but had never been formally
repealed. Thus, within three years from the time it proclaimed the
right of a defendant to a jury selected without discrimination against
such defendant's race, the Court effectively denied access to what had
appeared to be the most convenient means of enforcing the right. This
construction of the removal statute has been followed rigidly and
undoubtedly is still the law '3 As will be seen, however, it does not
deprive a Negro of a remedy in such cases. For, as was stated in a
recent Federal case:
"The removal of a criminal prosecution or a civil cause
under the statute in question because of the demal of a civil right or
the enforcement of such a right must arise out of the destruction of
such right by the constitution or statutory laws of the state wherein
the action is pending. The statute does not justify federal interfer-
ence where a party is deprived of any civil right by reason of dis-
cnmmation or illegal acts of individuals or judicial or adnmistrative
officers. If the alleged wrongs are committed by officers or indi-
viduals the remedy is the prosecution of the case to the lughest court
of the state and then to the Supreme Court of the United States as
the laws of the United States authorize.""
Such an interpretation of the removal statute has been criticized
as placing a needless obstacle in the way of the enforcement of a Negro
defendant's Constitutional right. It is said that by forcing the prose-
cution of appeals grounded upon the type of discrimination here
discussed all the way to the nation s highest court, the decision makes
practically impossible the final enforcement of rights by an impecun-
ious defendant, if state courts persist m their failure to eliminate such
exclusion.' r  Be this as it may, the remedy of " prosecution of
the case to the Supreme Court of the United States "16 by
writ of certiorari has, as hitherto stated, become increasingly effective
and increasingly common.
In earlier cases in which tis remedy was employed the court ap-
pears to have enforced rather rigorously the procedural prerequisites.
and several convictions were affirmed because of a failure to comply
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509 (1880).
'Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 26 Sup. Ct. 387,- 5(6L.
Ed. 633 (1906); Hull v. Jackson County Circuit Court, 138 F 2d 820 (C.CA.
6th 1943).
"Hull v. Jackson County Circuit Court, 138 F 2d 820, 821 (C.C.A. 6E 1:943).
'Note, 29 ILL. L. REv. 498 (1934).
"See note 14 supra,
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with evidentlary requirements.' 7 In another instance, in Thomas v.
State of Texas,' the Court reached the same result by giving almost
conclusive effect to the findings of fact of the state court. There it
was said:
whether such discrimination was practised in this case was a
question of fact, and the determination of that question adversely to
plaintiff in error by the trial court and by the Court of Cnrmnal
Appeals was decisive, so far as this court is concerned, unless it could
be held that these decisions constitute such abuse as amounted to an
infraction of the Federal Constitution, which cannot be presumed,
and which there is no reason to hold on the record before us.""'
Thus, by these means, the Court. though it continued to profess its
adherence to the principle enunciated in the Strauder case, actually
affirmed every conviction which it reviewed between 1880 and 1935,
with the exception of two. In the first of these two, Carter v Texas,20
decided in 1900, the defendant, a Negro, moved to quash the indict-
ment on the ground of discrimination, and offered to introduce evi-
dence showing that members of his race were systematically excluded
from the grand jury because of their race. The trial court refused to
hear the evidence and denied the motion. Upon affirmance by the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that the defendant had been deprived of
his constitutional rights.
The second of these reversals, Rogers v Alabama,21 decided four
years later, was similar on its facts. There, the defendant, a Negro
indicated for murder, duly filed a motion to quash the indictment on
the ground that members of his race had been discriminated against in
the selection of the grand jury which indicted him. The motion was
denied and the defendant excepted; whereupon the Supreme Court of
Alabama overruled this exception " seemingly on the ground that
the prolixity of the motion was sufficient to justify the action of the
court below" 2 2 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
with Mr. Justice Holmes stating the unanimous opinion that, "A mo-
tion of that length (two pages), made for the sole purpose of setting
up a constitutional right and distinctly claiming it, cannot be with-
'
7Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 26 Sup. Ct. 338, 50 L. Ed. 497 (1905);
Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U. S. 426, 23 Sup. Ct. 513, 47 L. Ed. 882(1903); Tarrance v, Florida, 188 U. S. 519, 23 Sup. Ct. 402, 47 L. Ed. 572(1903); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592, 16 Sup. Ct. 900, 40 L. Ed. 1082
(1896).
-" 212 U. S. 278, 29 Sup. Ct. 393, 53 L. Ed. 512 (1909).
' Id. at 282, 29 Sup. Ct. at 395, 53 L. Ed. at 514.
177 U. S..442, 20 Sup. Ct: 687, 44 L. Ed. 839 (1900).
1192 U. S. 226, 24 Sup. Ct. 257, 48 L. Ed. 418 (1904).
Id. at 229-230, 24 Sup. Ct. at -- , 48 L. Ed. at 418.
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drawn for prolixity from the consideration of this court, under the
color of local practice, because it contains a statement of matter which
perhaps it would have been better to omit but which is relevant to
the principal fact averred." 23  Fror this, it would appear that only
in those extreme cases in which the defendant was not even permitted
to raise the issue of discrimination in the state court, did the Court
overcome its reluctance to enforce the Negro defendants constitu-
tional rights.
In the case of Norris v Alabama,24 decided in 1935, was the first
of a modern series of decisions which tend in practice, as well as in
theory, to secure this right. In that case. Norris was one of the nine
Negro defendants in the famous "Scottsboro Case,"25 eight of whom
were convicted of rape in the trial court. It will be remembered that
the conviction of seven of these defendants was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of Alabama, but reversed by the Supreme Court of the
United Ctates26 " upon the ground that the defendants had been
denied due process of law in that the trial court had failed to
make an effective appointment of counsel to aid them in preparing
and presenting their defense."2 7 After the remand, the defendant's
(Norris) motion for a change of venue was granted and the case
brought to trial in Morgan County Alabama. At the outset the de-
fendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground of exclusion
of Negroes from the grand jury in Jackson County, where the de-
fendant was indicted. A motion to quash the trial ventre in Morgan
County was also made upon the same ground. After hearing evidence
on the charge, the trial court denied both motions, to which ruling
the defendant excepted. The trial proceeded, resulting in the convic-
tion of Noms, who was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed the judgment,28 and the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari. 29 It is desired to include a portion
of the review of the evidence found in Mr. Chief Justice Hughes opin-
ion, since such evidence as appeared in this case is in nearly every
respect typical of most of the cases which have arisen on this point
in Southern states:
"The etndence on the motion to quash the indictment. In
Id. at 230, 24 Sup. Ct. at - 48 L. Ed. at 418.
2'294 U. S. 587, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935).
"'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).
2 Ibzd.
SNoms v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 588, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 579, 79 L. Ed.
1074, 1076 (1935).
Norris v. State, 229 Ala. 226, 156 So. 556 (1934).
SNoms v. Alabama, 293 U. S. 552, 55 Sup. Ct. 345, 79 L. Ed. 655 (1935).
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1930, the total population of Jackson County, where the indictment
was found, was 36,881, of whom 2,688 were negroes. The male
population over twenty-one years of age numbered 8,801, and of
these, 666 were Negroes.
The qualifications of jurors were thus prescribed by the
state statute (Alabama Code, 1923, see. 8603)- 'The jury commission
shall place on the jury roll and in the jury box the names of all male
citizens of the county who are generally reputed to be honest and
intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for their in-
tegrity, good character and sound judgment, but no person must be
selected who is under twenty-one or over sxty-five years of age, or,
who is an habitual drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a perma-
nent disease or physical weakness is unfit to discharge the duties of ajuror, or who cannot read English, or who has ever been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude. If a person cannot read
English and has all the other qualifications prescribed herein and is a
freeholder or householder, his name may be placed on the jury roll
and in the jury box.
Defendant adduced evidence to support the charge of
unconstitutional discrimination in the actual admiistration of the stat-
ute in Jackson County. The testimony, as the state court said, tended
to show that 'in a long number of years no Negro had been called
for jury service in that county. It appeared that no Negro7 had served
on any grand or petit jury in that county within the memory of wit-
nesses who had lived there all their lives. Testimony to that effect
was given by men whose ages ran from fifty to seventy-six years.
Their testimony was uncontradicted. It was supported by the testi-
mony of officials. The clerk of the jury commssion and the clerk
of the circuit court had never known of a negro serving on a grandjury in Jackson County. The court reporter, who had not missed a
session in that county in twenty-four years, and two jury commissioners
testified to the same effect. One of the latter, who was a member
of the comnmssion wich made up the jury roll for the grand jury
which found the indictment, testified that he had never known of a
single instance where any Negro sat on any grand or petit jury in
the entire history of that county. "
Of this evidence, the Supreme Court said that it" made out a
prima facze case of the denial of the equal protection which the Con-
stitution guarantees."S' As to the alleged discrimination in the selec-
tion of the trial ventre, the Court held that there also the evidence,
similar to that set out above, was sufficient to establish discrimination.
The state s evidence seeking to rebut the showing of discrimination
is summarized by the statement of one of the jury commissioners:
"I do not know of any Negro in Morgan County over twenty-one and
under smty-five who is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent
and who is esteemed in the community for his integrity, good charac-
Norns v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 590-591, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 580-581, 79
L. Ed. 1074, 1077-78 (1935).3tId. at 591, 55 Sup. Ct. at 581, 79 L. Ed. at 1078.
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ter and sound judgment, who is not an habitual drunkard, who isn't
afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weakness which would
render him unfit to discharge the duties of a juror, and who can read
English, and who has never been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.".' 2 Of this, the Supreme Court said: "In the light of the
testimony given by defendant's witnesses, we find it impossible to
accept such a sweeping characterization of the lack of qualifications
of negroes in Morgan County It is so sweeping, and so contrary to
the evidence as to the many qualified Negroes that it destroys the in-
tended effect of the commissioners testimony '3 It continued,
"1 a conclusion that their continuous and total exclusion from juries
was because there were none possessing the requisite qualifications,
cannot be sustained."3 4
It appears that the Court in this case eliminated one of the two
methods by which it had, in former years, declined to enforce the
right of a Negro defendant-the acceptance of the state court's finding
of fact that no discrimination existed. Evidence of this change of posi-
ton is graphically illustrated by a comparison of the quotation from
Thomas v. State of Texas, supra, with the statement of the Court in a
1939 case, Pierre v Lousana:
"In our consideration of the facts and conclusion of the
facts the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court of Lousiana are
entitled to great respect. Yet, when a claim is properly asserted-as
in this case-that a citizen whose life is at stake has been demed the
equal protection of his country s laws on account of his race, it be-
comes our solemn duty to make independent inquiry and determina-
tion of the disputed facts "M
That the Court also became inclined to a more liberal view insofar
as procedure in such cases is concerned is thought to be shown by
subsequent cases. One of these, Hale v Kentucky,36 illustrates this
point. There, " petitioner, a negro, was indicted in 1936 for
murder in McCracken County, Kentucky He moved to set aside the
indictment upon the ground that the jury commissioners had excluded
from the list from which the grand jury was drawn all persons of
African descent because of their race and color and thus denied to him
the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."37  He presented an affidavit alleging that " the
Id. at 598-599, 55 Sup. Ct. at 584, 79 L. Ed. at 1081.
Id. at 599, 55 Sup. Ct. at 584, 79 L. Ed. at 1081.
" Ibid.
'Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358, 59 Sup. Ct. 536, 538-589, 83 L.
Ed. 760, 76- (1939).
' 303 U. S. 613, 58 Sup. Ct. 753, 82 L. Ed. 1050 (1938).7Id. at 614, 58 Sup. Ct. at 753, 82 L. Ed. at 1051.
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assessor s books for the county contained the names of approximately
6000 white persons and 700 Negroes who were qualified for jury
service s38 but that the jury commissioners filled the wheel for
jury service exclusively with the names of white citizens and that no
Negro was excluded " because he was not an intelligent, sober,
discreet, and impartial citizen, resident housekeeper of the county or
not of the requisite age."3 9
"The affidavit further stated that petitioner could prove
by sheriffs of McCracken County, serving respectively from 1906 to
1936, that during their terms no Negroes had been summoned for
service on any grand or petit jury in the county nor was the name of
any Negro placed in the hands of the sheriff to be so summoned; also
that petitioner could prove by federal officials that for many years
pnor to 1936 Negro citizens of the county had served on junes m
the federal court at Paducah; also that petitioner coufd prove by
many named citizens of standing in the community that for a long
period of years there were Negroes who were citizens of the county
and qualified for service on juries in the state court. Petitioner
alleged that the proof would show a long continued unvarying and
wholesale exclusion of Negroes from jury service in this county on
account of their race and color, and that this practice had been
systematic and arbitrary on the part of the officers and commissioners
selecting names for jury service for a period of fifty years or longer"
The Commonwealths Attorney, having stipulated that the affidavit
should be considered as evidence and that all witnesses named would
testify as therein set forth, introduced no evidence to the contrary
The motion to set aside the indictment was denied, however, as was a
subsequent motion to discharge the entire panel of the trial jury upon
the same facts. Hale, having reserved his exceptions, pleaded not
guilty and the trial proceeded; he was convicted and sentenced to
death. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky 41 which apparently grounded its decision on this point upon
the fact that Hale s affidavit did not set out that the undemed discrimi-
nation against Negroes occurred" solely because they were mem-
bers of that race,"42 as the Court of Appeals believed to be required
by previous Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari43 and on argument of the case there, the then Assistant Attor-
ney General of Kentucky, Mr. A. E. Funk, conceded that if the facts
set forth in the affidavits were sufficient to show a denial of the peti-
s Ibid.
9 ibid.
, Id. at 614-615, 58 Sup. Ct. at 753, 82 L. Ed. at 1051-1052.
Hale v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 743, 108 S.W 2d 716 (1937).
I'2 d. at 748, 108 S.W 2d at 718.
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 629, 58 Sup. Ct. 528, 82 L. Ed. 1089 (1938).
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tioner s constitutional rights, the judgment should be reversed. The
Court, finding them sufficient, did reverse, ignoring the state court's
technical point.
That such reversals are forcing a change in the practice of selecting
a jury so as to exclude Negroes entirely is shown by the case of Akins
v Texas.44 The facts of that case, which was decided in 1944, indicate
that the jury commissioners of Dallas County, Texas, were attempting
to abide at least by the letter of the decisions handed down shortly
before in Smith v Texas45 and Hill v Texas.4 6 In both of these cases
convictions of rape were reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States because of the exclusion of Negroes from the grand juries bring-
ing the indictments. In the Akis case it appeared that a former con-
viction of Akins, a Negro, had been reversed by the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas on the issue of discrimination. Following this, the
judge of the district court instructed the jury commissioners that there
should be no discrimination agamst anyone because of his color;
whereupon these commissioners placed upon the grand jury panel the
name of one Negro. Akins was then reindicted by the grand jury on
which the one Negro was serving, and, his timely motion to quash the
indictment having been denied, he was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment, and the Supreme Court granted certioran.4 7 The discrimination
alleged this time " was said to consist of an arbitrary and purpose-
ful limitation by the Grand Jury Commissioners of the number of
Negroes to one, who was to be placed upon the grand jury panel of
sixteen for the term of court at which the indictment against petitioner
was found." 45  The Court, after reviewing the evidence, was
4 unconvinced that the commissioners deliberately and intention-
ally limited the number of Negroes on the grand jury list,"4 9 and
affirmed the judgment. Mr. Justice Reed, delivering the opinion of
the majority, stated: "Tis conclusion makes it unnecessary to decide
whether a purposeful limitation of jurors by race to the approximate
proportion that the elegible jurymen of the race so limited bears to
the total eligibles is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment."50
Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a forceful dissenting opinion, in which
" 325 U. S. 398, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945).
311 U. S. 128, 61 Sup. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940).
" 316 U. S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942).
' Akns v. Texas, 324 U. S. 836, 65 Sup. Ct. 865, 89 L. Ed. 1400 (1945).
's Alans v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 400, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 1277-1278, 89 L. Ed.
1692, 1694 (1945).
" Id. at 407, 65 Sup. Ct. at 1281, 89 L. Ed. at 1698.
' Ibid.
KENTUcKY LAw JouHNAL
Mr. Chief Justice Stone concurred. There it was stated that the rec-
ord clearly showed that the jury commissioners intended to discrnmi-
nate against Negroes by limiting to one their representation on the
grand jury, and that, "The equal protection clause guarantees peti-
tioner not only the right to have Negroes considered as prospective
vemremen but also the right to have them considered without numen-
cal or proportional limitation."5i It seems safe to predict that this
question of whether proportional limitation is constitutional will re-
quire a decision in the near future.
The latest word on discrimination in the selection of the jury is
found m the Supreme Court decision in the case of Patton v Misszs-
stppi.52 In this case the defendant, a Negro, was convicted of murder
despite hIs timely motions to quash the indictment and to set aside
the trial panel because of discrimination. The Supreme Court of
Mississippi affirmed the judgment, justifying its decision as follows;
Section 1762 of the Mississippi Code enumerates certain qualifications
for jurors, the most inportant of which were that one must be a male
citizen and a qualified elector." To be such a "qualified elector" one
must produce satisfactory evidence of payment of an annual poll tax
and be able to read any section of the State Constitution or to under-
stand the same when read to him, or to give a reasonable interpreta-
tion thereof. The Mississippi court estimated that approximately
twenty-five Negroes out of a total Negro population of 12,511 would
be so qualified, and concluded:
"Of the 25 qualified Negro male electors there would be
left, therefore, as those not exempt, 12 or 13 available male Negro
electors as compared with 5,500 to 6,000 male white electors as to
whom, after deducting 500 to 1,000 exempt, would leave a propor-
tion of 5,000 nonexempt white jurors to 12 or 18 nonexempt Negro
jurors, or about one-fourth of one percent Negro jurors-400 to 1
For the reasons already heretofore stated there was only a chance of
1 in 400 that a Negro would appear on such a venre and as this
venre was of one hundred jurors, the sheriff, had he brought m a
Negro would have had to discrimnate against white jurors, not against
Negroes-he could not be expected to bring in one-fourth of one
Negro."
Judge Black, who wrote the reversing opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, was unconvinced by these statistics, stating that they
illustrate " the unwisdom of attempting to disprove systematic
racial discrimination in the selection of jurors by percentage calcula-
Id. at 409, 65 Sup. Ct. at 1282, 89 L. Ed. at 1699.
32 U. S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. - (1947).
Id. at 467, 68 Sup. Ct. at 187, 92 L. Ed. at --
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tions applied to the composition of a single venire."54 He further
stated:
"It is to be noted at once that the indisputable fact that
no Negro had served on a criminal court grand or petit jury for a
period of thirty years created a very strong showing that during that
period Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service be-
cause of race. When such a showing was made it became a duty of
the state to try to justify such an exclusion as having been brought
about for some reason other than racial discnrmnation."''
The opinion then concluded:
"We hold that the State wholly failed to meet the very
strong evidence of purposeful racial discrimination made out by the
petitioner upon the uncontradicted showing that for thirty years or
more no Negro had served as a juror in the criminal courts of Lauder-
dale County. When a jury selection plan, whatever it is, operates in
such a way as always to result in the complete and long-continued
exclusion of any representative at all from a large group of Negroes,
or any other racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against
them by juries thus selected cannot stand."'
Considering then, the principles enunciated in the foregoing series
of cases, there can be little doubt that the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky reached the correct conclusion on the issue of discrimination in
the two recent cases which prompted this inquiry In the first of
these, Pool v Commonwealth, the defendant, a Negro, was indicted
by the grand jury of Christian County for the murder of a white wo-
man. He was convicted and sentenced to death. Among other grounds
for reversal which the defendant urged on appeal were: (1) The trial
court erred in denying his petition to remove the case to Federal court,
and (2) the indictment should have been quashed on defendant's
motion because of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury serv-
ice in Christian County solely because of their race. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the rulings of the circuit court in denying these
motions. Looking first at the petition for removal, it is seen that de-
fendant specified therein three grounds as justification for the re-
quested removal: (1) that he was held without right of bail, (2) that
he was without mental capacity at the time of the crime, and (8) that
he was a victim of racial prejudice. Considering only the third of
these grounds, it will be remembered that the Federal removal statute,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, permits removal only m cases
where a defendant is being deprived of a constitutional right by the
constitution or statutes of a state. The defendant did not even make
' Id. at 468, 68 Sup. Ct. at 187, 92 L. Ed. at --
Id. at 466, 68 Sup. Ct. at 186, 92 L. Ed. at --
Id. at 468-469, 68 Sup. Ct. at 187, 92 L. Ed. at -
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such an allegation. As for the defendant's assignment of error in that
his motion to quash the indictment was overruled, it appears that the
trial court carefully considered the defendant's assertion by separate
hearing. The evidence showed that,
" the jury commissioners of the county, which has a colored
population amounting to about 30% of the total, had been regularly
instructed not to exclude colored persons from jury service on a racial
basis; that names of colored persons had been drawn from the jury
wheel for jury service with a fair degree of regularity during the past
few years; that at least one or possibly more names of colored persons
had been drawn for petit jury service from that same lot of jury wheel
names which produced the very grand jury of appellant's indictment.
This county has one colored magistrate and he himself testified on this
hearing to the effect that he had personally done grand jury service
within the past few years and that numerous colored persons of the
county had done jury service, especially on petit juries in the last
few years."5' s
It will be noted that this evidence appears much stronger against
the allegation of discrimination than that presented m Akmns v Texas,
supra, in which the Supreme Court declined to conclude that discrimi-
nation existed. It can hardly be questioned, therefore, that the Su-
preme Court would affirm the Kentucky Court's decision.5 18
In the second of these Kentucky cases, Logan v Commonwealth,
the defendant, a Negro indicted for rape of a white woman, was con-
victed and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Ie appealed,
one of his grounds being that the trial court, Daviess Circuit Court,
erred in overruling the motion to quash the indictment. It appears
that at the outset of the trial the following motion, signed by Logan s
counsel, was filed.
"Comes the defendant William Henry Logan, by counsel,
and moves the court to set aside the indictment herein, on the grounds
that a substantial error was made in the summomng and formation
of the grand jury in. that qualified Negro citizens are systematically
excluded from service thereon, solely because of their race and color."'
No affidavit was filed and no proof to support the motion was of-
fered. The trial court therefore overruled it. The Court of Appeals
affirmed this action on the authority of Montjoy v Commonwealth,60
in which a similar fact situation appeared, and in which case certiorari
1,Pool v. Commonwealth, 308 Kv. 107, 111, 213 S.W 2d 603, 605 (1948).
's The Court of Appeals itself pointed out in its opimon that the petitioner
might prosecute his cause further: "We think the trial court made no error in over-
ruling appellant's petition for removal, but if we ourselves are in error in this
respect he has further recourse to the U. S. Supreme Court by petition for
a review on writ of certiorari." Id. at 110, 213 S.W 2d at 605.
Logan v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 259, 261, 214 S.W 2d 279, 280 (1948).
®262 Ky. 426, 90 S.W 2d 362 (1935).
ALL-WHITE JURY
was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. 61 This case
illustrates the requirement, long ago established by the Supreme
Court 62 and never since relaxed, that in order for a defendant to be
entitled to a setting aside of a jury or to a quashing of an indictment,
he must offer proof in support of is motion.
In conclusion, then, it is believed beyond question that on the fact
the Court of Appeals rendered the correct decision in each of two
recent cases which it reviewed. Further, insofar as the general prob-
lem of discrimination in the selection of juries is concerned, it is
thought that the situation at the present time is as follows: The Su-
preme Court has shown itself extremely zealous in protecting the right
of a Negro defendant to be indicted and tried by a jury from which
members of his race are not systematically excludea solely because of
their race. It appears that the requisite evidence which will be con-
sidered by that Court as proving such discrimination is a showing
that, although there are a considerable number of Negroes who are
qualified for jury service, no member of that race has served on a jury
(grand and petit jury cases appear to be identically treated) for a long
period of years. Such a showing has repeatedly been held sufficient
to establish at least a prima facze case of discrimination. And if such
a showing is made it appears extremely unlikely, practically speaking,
that a satisfactory rebuttal can be made by the prosecution. It is well
settled that the statute authorizing removal of cases in which a de-
fendant is deprived of a constitutional right, to Federal court is with-
out application in this type of case today Tins is true because of the
requirement that, in order to justify such a removal, the discrimination
must be of constitutional or statutory origin. No such provision exists
in Kentucky today,6 3 or in any other state. The method Of enforce-
ment of the right is, then, by prosecution of the cause to the court of
last resort of the state, and then to the Supreme Court of the United
States if the state court denies relief. In order to pursue such a course,
it is necessary that a Negro defendant, (1) if he wishes to object to
the grand jury, move at the outset of the trial to quash the indictment,
or if his objection is to the petit jury, move to set aside the panel;
(2) accompany such a motion with an affidavit setting forth the de-
fendant's allegation of exclusion of Negroes, systematically and solely
' MontJoy v. Kentucky, 298 U.S. 646, 56 Sup. Ct. 961, 80 L. Ed. 1376 (1936).
' Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592, 16 Sup. Ct. 900, 40 L. Ed. 1082 (1896).
'In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509, 511 (1880), the court said: "We
therefore hold that so much of our statute as excludes all persons other than white
men from service on juries is unconstitutional, and that no person can be lawfully
excluded from any jury on account of his race or color."
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because of their race, and naming the witnesses by whom the defen-
dant intends to prove such discrimination; (3) offer his evidence;
(4) except to an overruling of his motion after the evidence has been
heard, or to any demal by the court to hear such evidence; (5) assign
as error the trial court's ruling, upon appeal to the state s highest court;
and (6) petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
certiorari, if relief be denied in the state court.
Finally, the determination of the Supreme Court to enforce obedi-
ence to the Constitution, as interpreted by that Court, reversing and
remanding cases in which discrnmation in the selection of the jury is
found, appears unlikely to be deterred by any excuse, or by any scheme
designed to disguise discrimination which in reality exists. Jurisdic-
tions which persist in excluding qualified Negro citizens from jury
service are believed to be inviting frequent appeals from convictions
of Negro defendants.
